Unsichere Software-Updates und Infection proxys Systems

Lukas Grunwald DN-Systems GmbH Germany CeBIT 2010- iX Forum 2010 Hannover

Software update cures it all

- Vendors publish security patches via Software Updates
- Adobe plans to install / update software for the Acrobat Reader autonomously
 - No user control any more
 - Background process while user is online
- Apple updates Safari and iTunes with Apple Update
- Microsoft updates in Background
 - (XP, Vista, W7, Server)
- How trusted are this update mechanism?



Update via Internet

- 1. DNS Resolve of update cluster / hosts
- 2. Connect to the update server
- 3. Get a index of actual version
- 4. Calculate the needed patches / updates
- 5. Download the patch / updates
- 6. Install them on the target system



Attacks to updates

- DNS Spoofing to redirect to a forge server
- Transparent infection Proxy
 - Can sit on the wire, or as Trojan on the system
 - Drive By Exploits
 - Fake-Downloads from 3rd Party Download Sites
 - Google Search poisoning



Motivation for Poisoning

- Lawful Interception / Offensive Forensic
- Criminal Intention
 - Attack Home Banking
 - Zombie infection to get a Bot-Net Node
 - Referrer Poisoning go get sales margin
- Private Investigation
- Corporate Intelligence

Poisoned Update Inband



- In-band Infection
- Download is diverted via transparent proxy
- Used for remote forensics
- Support from software industry will make it easy
- Possible with every software download / upload



Poisoned Downloads



- DNS-Redirection
- Download from rouge server
- Mostly exploits
- Standard method for trojan infection
- Possible with every software download / upload





Some Updates as example

- Adobe Download Manager
 - Critical Security Flaw
 - Browser Plugin (DLM)
 - Any software could be injected and executed
- Adobe Acrobat is responsible for 80% of all known attacks over the last year



Adobe Update

📶 Follow TCP Stream	<u>- 0 ×</u>
_Stream Content	
GET /manifest/60/win/AdobeUpdater.upd HTTP/1.1	<u> </u>
Accept: *	
Host: swupmf.adobe.com	
HTTP/1 1 200 oK	
Server: Apache	
Last-Modified: Tue, 20 Jan 2009 18:56:28 GMT	
Accept-Ranges: bytes	
Content-Length: 3524	
Date: wed. 03 Mar 2010 17:48:32 GMT	
Connection: keep-alive	
Y. T. MARCS+leENrM7t7iVo3TmmOEASErVGVOHS8tEClxfsbbl1BimlGbv1E5sb0PbYUESEZbc4DKD774BltoM5t5	
+viqJwfq3wyS716nvOLlge+9LtONSPRI4aP/rpn7GqYMNvuS9yGYqFEQWophMdqAMQ1N7UrmvtQDvDJCcvHUq+c= <manifest <="" auversion="5.0" td=""><td>></td></manifest>	>
<component category="AUIM" name="AdobeUpdater"> <disnlayname default="en US"></disnlayname></component>	
<pre><pre><pre><pre><pre><pre><pre><pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre>	
<pre><pre><pre><pre><pre><pre><pre><pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre></pre>	
<pre></pre> <pre><</pre>	
<size>93048</size>	
Eind Save As Print Entire conversation (207914 bytes)) Raw
Help	



Adobe Update

- Uses Signed Files
- CRL is implemented and updated before update
 - Lost Certificate is not fatal
- Update uses unencrypted HTTP
- Whole security depends on Adobe Certificates
- NO SSL or Secure Channel



Apple Update

📶 Follow TCP Stream
_Stream Content
GET /content/catalogs/others/index-windows-1.sucatalog HTTP/1.1 Accept: */* Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; officeLiveConnector.1.3; OfficeLivePatch.0.0; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729; .NET CLR 1.1.4322) Host: swcatalog.apple.com Connection: Keep-Alive Cookie: s_vi=[CS]v1 4312252A000034C9-A000C7100000001[CE]
HTTP/1.1 200 oK Last-Modified: Fri, 19 Feb 2010 01:23:59 GMT ETag: "6475385-161aa-4b7de82f" Accept-Ranges: bytes Content-Length: 90538 Content-Type: text/plain Server: Apache/1.3.33 (Darwin) Cache-Control: max-age=11 Expires: Wed, 03 Mar 2010 17:55:57 GMT Date: Wed, 03 Mar 2010 17:55:46 GMT Connection: keep-alive
<pre><?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> <!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple Computer//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN" "http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd"> <plist version="1.0"> <dict> .<key>ApplePostFreq</key> .<string>100</string> .<key>ApplePostURL</key> .<string>http://swquery.apple.com/WebObjects/SoftwareUpdatesStats</string> .<key>IndexDate</key> .<date>2010-02-19T01:23:58Z</date> .<key>Products</key> .<dict> </dict></dict></plist></pre>
Find Save As Print Entire conversation (91293 bytes)
Help Filter Out This Stream



Apple Update

- No CRL used lost certificate is fatal
- Uses Scripts during Updates
- Security depends only on URL
- No secure channel is used
- Software Distribution / Update is XML Based



Microsoft Update

- Update is using CRL correct
 - Lost certificate is not fatal
 - Software segments are singed
 - Update uses HTTP (not HTTPS)
 - Microsoft Update V6 is secure as long no valid Signing Certificate is shared with Law-Enforcement or Criminals (Insider Attacks)



Avoiding Infection Proxys

- Verify MD5/SHA-1 hashes of downloaded software before installation
- Dangerous co-operation of system and software vendors
 - Trusted software signatures for LEAs
 - Creation of poisoned system software or operating systems
 - Installation via signed Vista system driver possible
- Open Source operating systems
- Self-compilation of software and system using publicly available source code (BSD / Linux / ...)



Thank you, keep in mind ...



High-tech ≠ High-security